The image of Mr Khan cycling rapidly even while stuck in one place seems a perfect metaphor for Pakistan’s post-election politics. The PTI’s unexpected success in the elections demonstrated the party’s resilience under pressure. Yet, while it has managed to form a provincial government, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, PTI leaders are otherwise marginalised. Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif enjoys firm support from the “establishment”, as Pakistan’s armed forces are melodically known. He now heads a minority national administration rooted in his family’s dynastic party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Mr Sharif has recently finalised a Cabinet of technocrats and traditional politicians. After two tumultuous years, he could be forgiven for hoping for calm.
But they will find it elusive. Mr. Sharif’s government faces three challenges in the coming months. The first is that Mr. Khan remains determined to overturn the status quo, even from jail. PTI leaders, angered by allegations of vote-rigging during the February poll, say they will seek redress through parliament, the courts and peaceful street protests. Their goals include a new election and freedom for Mr. Khan and other jailed leaders. “I have no doubt — and I think the party is very confident — that the so-called result of this election will be overturned,” said Taimur Jhagra, a former PTI provincial minister, referring to evidence of voting fraud the party is presenting in the courts.
Yet Pakistan’s judges rarely defer to the military’s preferences in major political cases. And since February, the government has used social-media blackouts and the police’s use of overwhelming force to suppress PTI public demonstrations. Powerful army chief Gen. Asim Munir is showing no signs of relenting. In a recent statement after a conference of top generals, the military condemned those in Pakistan who are “creating political instability and uncertainty” by resorting to “emotional outbursts,” an apparent reference to the PTI.
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Even if he overcomes Mr. Khan’s pressure campaign, Mr. Sharif faces another major problem: Pakistan’s shaky economy, which is in the midst of a crisis that has lasted several years. Gross domestic product fell slightly in 2023 amid high debt, a balance of payments crisis and inflation, which peaked near 40% before falling back to its current rate of 23%. Before the election, while leading a government that lasted 16 months, Mr. Sharif averted disaster by securing a $3 billion stand-by emergency loan from the IMF. That arrangement expires in April. Mr. Sharif and his successor caretaker administration earned credit for delivering a primary fiscal surplus. But they failed to pursue the deep reforms that Pakistan has long needed.
The new government is expected to go back to the IMF for a bigger and longer-term package. If agreed, it would be the 25th IMF bail-out in Pakistan’s 77-year history, making the country one of the most profligate borrowers of the fund. There is no doubt that a new multi-year arrangement is possible, perhaps in the range of $6 billion. “Even our enemies don’t want us to fail or default,” says Miftah Ismail, who will serve as finance minister through 2022. A new IMF program would seek to reduce Pakistan’s staggering debt levels, which some analysts now consider unsustainable.
Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country with a population of 242 million, is virtually too big to fail. Yet this has only led to complacency and corruption, encouraging its leaders to rely on emergency external finance and temporary fiscal adjustments rather than economic restructuring.
First as tragedy
Will it be different this time? Mr Sharif has raised hopes by appointing Muhammad Aurangzeb, the Wharton-educated CEO of one of Pakistan’s largest private banks, as his finance minister. Mr Aurangzeb has promised ambitious reforms and declared after his appointment that he would tolerate “no debate, no time wasted: only firm commitment to implementation”. But whether Mr Sharif will support him to go ahead is uncertain.
A plan to sell debt-ridden Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) will provide an early test. Forty years ago PIA offered better service than its state-owned counterparts in India. But during the 1990s, the carrier’s market share collapsed due to the rise of formidable Gulf competitors such as Emirates and competition driven by an open skies policy. By 2017 PIA had 550 employees for every plane, two and a half times its target. The airline is now saddled with a debt burden of more than $3 billion rupees. Mr Sharif has launched a plan to wipe out PIA’s debt and split the company in two, so that the core operations can be offered for sale.
The PIA case points to some of the problems that have long plagued modernisers in the country. Privatisation of state-owned firms affects workers, their families and unions: groups that are politically well-connected and who have vetoed even the most common-sense divestments of state assets. Other reforms affect far more citizens and are thus even more politically sensitive. These ideas include banning the government from fixing prices; taxing retail and agriculture, which were previously exempt areas; or withdrawing costly fuel subsidies. However, whenever such changes are attempted, they provoke massive opposition, amplified by social media and the only partially free broadcasters.
Pakistan’s military-run, limited democratic system also prevents civilian leaders from taking bold steps. Mr Khan’s rise and fall is an example of this: in 2018 the armed forces were widely seen as his supporters. Four years later, they were believed to be behind Mr Khan’s ouster.
The third test for the new government comes in the form of a campaign of terror launched by the Tehreek-i-Taliban (TTP), the Pakistani wing of the Taliban movement. Since the Afghan Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 2021, there has been a surge in TTP-linked attacks in Pakistan, killing more than 2,200 people, according to the government. Many of the victims have been members of the security forces. The latest TTP attack came on March 16 when suicide bombers attacked a military base on the Afghan border, killing at least seven soldiers. Pakistani jets retaliated by striking alleged TTP bases inside Afghanistan.
This situation threatens to worsen. Pakistan has accused Afghanistan’s Taliban regime of aiding and sheltering the TTP. “The terrorism against us is mostly being conducted from Afghanistan,” Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said after the latest attack. Over the past two years, Pakistan has tried various forms of persuasion and pressure to influence the restored Taliban regime in Kabul. These efforts have included diplomatic talks, blocking cross-border trade, expelling Afghan refugees from Pakistan and military action. None of these have worked. Although the Afghan Taliban has issued orders banning Afghans from fighting inside Pakistan, the attacks and allegations of Kabul’s complicity continue.
Mr Sharif has long accommodated the armed forces. Decisions about how to deal with the Taliban regime in Kabul will rest in the hands of General Munir. The army chief is a more reticent figure than some of his predecessors. Well-connected analysts say the general is primarily interested in strengthening Pakistan’s bedrock alliance with China and its historic ties with Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, where the general visited on March 20.
General Munir also visited the US late last year, hosted by Central Command, the military force responsible for Afghanistan and Pakistan. These days, Pakistan’s accommodating but largely transactional relationship with Washington provides a modest hedge against its dependence on China and helps smooth its dealings at the IMF.
the second as a farce
General Munir may also want more influence over the country’s economy. Last year he spoke of a new body, the Special Investment Facilitation Council, of which he is a member, which he said would create an “investor-friendly system that will avoid unnecessary delays and provide easier terms and conditions for business”, particularly in mining and agriculture. Its apparent aim is to attract direct investment from Gulf sovereign-wealth funds and elsewhere. Still, as long as Pakistan’s most popular politicians are locked up on dubious charges and their supporters clamour for redress, it will be hard for Pakistan to advertise itself as a stable destination for investment.
The tragedy of Pakistan has been that it has been unable to maintain a workable political consensus. “The reason our economy is in shambles is that every three years we press the self-destruct button and start from scratch again,” says Mr. Jhagra, a former PTI provincial minister. But being aware of the problem is one thing and addressing it is another. The reality is that if Mr. Khan wants to achieve political rehabilitation, he will probably need Gen. Munir’s blessing or a reconciliation deal with the other major civilian parties. Neither seems likely.
Mr. Khan’s charisma and rebellion have given his party and his country a rollercoaster ride. During his stay in prison, he recently told his sister, “I am really busy gaining knowledge by reading about history, politics and Sufism.” Perhaps Mr. Khan can help correct his country’s dysfunction by sharing newfound insights with generals and rival politicians. He could start with Rumi, the most famous Sufi poet: “Yesterday I was very clever, so I wanted to change the world. Today I am wise, so I am changing myself.”
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