Low guess of Hamas’s strength, over confidence; Where did the mistake happen from Israel, shocking revelations in the report

Last update:February 28, 2025, 14:04 IST

Israel Army: Israel revealed its mistakes during Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack. In the report, the Israeli army agreed to underestimate Hamas and failing to protect citizens.

Jerusalem: Where did the mistake come from Israel? Was Israel in overconfidence? There are now shocking revelations about Hamas-Israel War. The Israeli army published the first official details of its mistakes during Hamas’s 7 October 2023 attack. The report concluded that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) failed in its mission to protect the Israeli citizens. Not only this, Israel made a mistake to underestimate Hamas.

The Palestinian Group attacked Israel on 7 October 2023. Hamas members killed around 12,00 people and took 251 people hostage. After this, Israel started attacking Hamas control Gaza Strip. More than 48 thousand Palestinians died in the Israeli attack. The United Nations says that about two-thirds of Gaza buildings were damaged or destroyed by Israeli attacks.

According to media reports, in the 19 -page Israeli army report, the findings of the army show how he misunderstood Hamas’s intentions and underestimated his abilities. It said that the army considered Gaza and Hamas a second security threat, while the priority was given to Iran and Hizbullah. The army’s policy regarding Gaza was ‘contradictory’.

According to the report, it was assumed that Hamas’ is neither interested in war on a large scale nor is preparing for it. This notion strengthened by Hamas’s fraudulent strategy. The information received since 2018 was telling that Hamas was actually developing an ambitious plan. However, such inputs were interpreted as ‘unrealistic or impractical’, which reflects the ‘long -term aspirations of Hamas’ rather than the action ‘actionable threat’.

The report said that in the months before the war, the Directorate of Military Intelligence made a new assessment that Hamas’s plan was not just an idea, but ‘a solid outline for operational planning’. However, this assessment was not brought to the attention of senior officials of the military intelligence department. The report identified Hamas’s intentions and ways to deal with the threats arising out of it.